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The 2005 American Housing Survey reveals that 11% of residents on the west coast of the USA live in gated
communities. The trend is not confined to America: just about all new housing built in China over the last 10 years is
gated, with neighbourhood walls, guards, owner-governance structures, fees and neighbourhood management and
investment plans based not on the municipal government model but on the model of the member-controlled club:
hence the idea of ‘cities of clubs’. Residential club economics are compelling. There is, in principle, no reason why
large parts of British cities should not evolve in this way. While this will happen piecemeal under current laws, urban
land reform that allows neighbourhoods to opt-out of municipal ownership and governance of non-strategic local
public goods, could fundamentally reshape British cities for the better. It would also spawn a multi-billion pound
private neighbourhood management market and replace the long-waves of urban decay and renewal that are
characteristic of public ownership, with a far more responsive re-investment regime.
1. Introduction
There is, in most cities in most countries, an important
institutional gap in public governance structure at the neighbour-
hood level. The urban neighbourhood is the spatial scale of
consumption sharing that is most important to the average citizen
but it is the least well organised for collective action (Webster,
2003). The Westminster government’s current neighbourhood
planning experiment partially addresses this problem but the
problem is much deeper than an absence of development
coordination instruments at a local scale. It is a problem with
the way markets for public goods are structured. For this reason,
privately governed neighbourhoods (referred to as ‘club commu-
nities’ after Nobel economist James Buchanan’s theory of ‘club
goods’ (Buchanan, 1965)) are emerging rapidly in cities through-
out the world, threatening radically to change the way in which
we order urban affairs (Le Goix and Webster, 2008; Plaut, 2011).
Inapaper that askedwhygated communities (ahighlyvisible form
ofclubcommunity)are flourishing insomeEuropeancountriesbut
not others, Zoltan Cse´falvay (BusinessMinister in the Hungarian
government) and the present author, found evidence that this new
institution is best explained by the level of centralisation of a
country’s public expenditure (Cse´falvay and Webster, 2010).
Tested against alternative hypotheses, this explanation had great-
est statistical discriminating power – above a country’s crime
levels, income inequality and preference for public over private
sector. It was concluded that club communities tend to emerge
because of the lack of what economists call ‘fiscal equivalence’:
an equivalence between the value of taxes paid and benefits
received. In a privately supplied, owned and governed neighbour-
hood, fiscal equivalence is high. You get what you pay for.
Because of a misaligned incentive structure for investment, the
public parts of cities do not renew themselves as they could do
if organised differently. Urban renewal becomes a political
process and is either undersupplied or not supplied at all. So
cities pass through cycles of decline and renewal, the
wavelengths of which are far too long because the political
signals that trigger action only kick-in when the problems
become deep enough to generate expressions of public disquiet.
This would be different in a ‘city of clubs’.
2. How a city of clubs could work
As a thought experiment, imagine a city made up of spatially
contiguous territorial clubs. Instead of a network of publicly
owned land used for streets, open space and facilities, edged
and filled by private land parcels, imagine a patchwork of
collectively owned territories transversed by the city’s road grid
located on public easements or on land retained under public
ownership. Within these contractual communities, neighbours
coordinate their affairs through micro-governance structures
including those that give them the right to charge service fees
and raise new assessments for investment projects. They have a
constitution, voting and decision-making rules and active
maintenance and investment plans. Driving through a city will
take you through and past many of these neighbourhoods.
Some will be physically enclosed with gates, others open (about
60% of club communities in the USA have chosen not to erect
gates). Those that you pass through may charge for passage by
way of telemetric charging, possibly with price determined by
residents (a decentralised version of congestion charge). On-
street parking charges might also be set and regularly adjusted
by neighbourhoods, giving residents and commercial operators
the ability to balance parking congestion with car-born
customer footfall and parking income (Shoup, 2004).
Whether or not a neighbourhood is physically enclosed with
gates, all are legally enclosed and constituted as contractual
communities.
Urban Design and Planning
Volume 165 Issue DP1
Briefing: Cities of clubs
Webster
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers
Urban Design and Planning 165 March 2012 Issue DP1
Pages 3–6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/udap.2012.165.1.3
Paper 1100047
Received 05/12/2011 Accepted 05/12/2011
Keywords: local government/town and city planning/
urban regeneration
ice | proceedings ICE Publishing: All rights reserved
3
The legal enclosure of neighbourhoods into residential,
commercial and mixed use club communities extends the genre
established by shopping malls. Malls are highly efficient
private versions of traditional High Streets. Externalities are
internalised such that investments that attract more customers
can be recouped from rents. In residential club communities,
investments are recouped through increased house prices and
rents. Owner-occupiers have a double incentive to pay the fees
and assessments that support club governance: immediate use
value and future resale value. Landlords have an incentive to
improve not only their private properties but their shared
streets and spaces to increase and/or stabilise long-term rents.
The analogy with the shopping mall is more exact for rental
than for owner-occupied properties, so think residential malls,
co-owned by a partnership of multiple landlords.
The menu of legal institutions variously used to create
contractual neighbourhoods in countries around the globe
include: trusts, mutual associations, commonhold tenure,
condominiums, strata title, home owners associations, residen-
tial associations, joint stock companies, private companies and
other variants. The UK has community land trusts, community
mutuals, commonhold associations, companies limited by
guarantee and other options. None of them are perfect
instruments for the job but they will continue to evolve as
demand for club communities continues to rise.
3. Effects on economy, environment and
society
In the typical British city centre, apartment lessees can
currently expect to pay a service fee of perhaps £2000 per
year. Less centrally, this may go down to £1000. If this is
thought of as a private governance fee (a contractual version of
council tax) that covers maintenance of and reinvestment in
shared spaces as well as services such as security, lifts,
clubhouses, swimming pools, gyms and landscaping, the figure
can be thought of as the revealed demand for additional micro-
urban government with high fiscal equivalence. If the infra-
structure for private neighbourhood governance was in place
throughout the city, the effect on the urban environment and
level of services could be huge. There were 62 million residents
in the UK in 2010 living in 25 million households. If each
household had a demand of £1000/year for additional
neighbourhood services, a 25 billion pound a year industry in
continual neighbourhood improvement would be spawned. If
some of the services currently provided by local authorities
were transferred to private neighbourhood governments and
with them a fraction of local taxes, the industry could be
approaching the size of the higher education market in the UK.
This is not urban planning science fiction: approaching 100% of
houses built in China’s sprawling newmetropolises are governed
by local neighbourhood organisations. Residents pay by
contractual fee for much of what we expect from our local
governments. This is particularly significant in the context of a
country with no recent history in modern town halls. When the
functions of municipal governance had to be rediscovered after
Chinese urban land reforms in the 1990s, the development
industry (in its widest definition, including private developers,
local governments, land owners, financiers, property manage-
ment companies, commercial and residential owners and
renters) apparently discovered that the most efficient way of
drawing proprietary boundaries was at the edge of the
neighbourhood, not just at the edge of the individual property.
Multiple levels of ‘front door’ appeared in the urban fabric: the
‘home’ (apartment, town house, villa, office, shop); the
apartment block or commercial building; the micro-neighbour-
hood (groups of a few buildings); and the larger neighbourhood
(estate). More significant than the gates (many of which remain
open, leaving the territories permeable for pedestrians), are the
public goods that can be supplied to the spatially specific
markets thus created. From the Chinese communities which the
current author has visited, as from others across the world, there
are many stories demonstrating the compelling logic of the
residential club economy: an underused lawn ripped up a year
after being constructed to build a basketball court; reusing
redundant space to build a children’s and grandchild’s hotel in
an elderly people’s gated community; gates going up for more
security; unused gates coming down; landscaping improved;
community energy generation installed; rare flora and fauna
preserved; cycle paths constructed; and so on.
As the private neighbourhood market matures, so choice
increases. As imperfectly envisioned by American economist
Charles Tiebout in the 1950s, a market in urban public goods
and services can evolve if people vote with their feet, selecting
between alternative packages of shared goods and services
supplied in different jurisdictions at different prices (Tiebout,
1956). Tiebout had in mind competing cities offering different
bundles of civic goods at different tax prices. The rapidly
emerging intra-city market in neighbourhoods is a better
practical outworking of the Tieboutian model. It describes very
well what seems to be happening in countries without strongly
decentralised local tax and spend jurisdictions. As a normative
model it also has its attractions. A private neighbourhood
market raises the total amount spent on the environment and
welfare-enhancing services; it increases choice; it produces
diversity and surprise in the style, design and functions of
different parts of the city; it fosters responsibility; and it
stimulates neighbourhood interaction and organisation. It may
even encourage an old-fashioned sense of neighbourliness. In
one neighbourhood visited by the current author in Pretoria,
residents proudly welcomed through their (retro-fitted) gates
weekend visitors from less organised neighbourhoods,
attracted by the community’s well-preserved and secure green
walkways and parks.
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It is easy to find negative commentaries about gated
communities; mostly coming from academics with an ideolo-
gical agenda against what they see as the destruction of
the public realm. There are undoubtedly genuine concerns
raised by the vision of a city of clubs. Many worries are
unsubstantiated, however, and it has been noticeable how
many negative views have softened over a decade of studying
this phenomenon. The real issue may not be the alleged social
costs of residential clubs (increase in the fear of others, social
fragmentation and so on) but the private costs. Private urban
governance has a dynamic that is not at all dissimilar to city-
scale politics and bureaucracy. In addition, some of the
administrative costs of urban bureaucracies are replaced by
legal costs. The costs of managing urban affairs by contract
(Webster, 2005) may in the end prove too costly, as the levels
of litigation associated with gated communities in the USA
may suggest (McKenzie, 2003). Quality of voluntary (non-
professional) neighbourhood governors and principal-agent
problems arising from property management companies
(agent) and home-owner association (principal) relationships
are other risks. This is all part of the social experiment
underway, however. The current author’s guess would be that
the economics of private neighbourhoods is compelling
enough for the genre to take over large parts of our cities.
The present author believes that club communities are here to
stay, at least for a while (these things always cycle in longer
term social experiments). General-purpose municipal govern-
ments owning and servicing interstitial space between private
buildings may prove to be a peculiarly twentieth century
phenomenon associated with the era of modernism and
municipal socialism.
4. Urban land reform and the Big Society
Some have referred to the gating of neighbourhoods as the
medievalisation of the city. There is something in the notion
but it misses the point that private urban governance is an
emergent spontaneous phenomenon driven by the city’s ability,
as a complex adaptive system, to self-organise in pursuit of
greater wealth and welfare. In the UK, this process is inhibited
by the local state’s monopoly control over neighbourhood
public goods. For the residents of Britain’s drab suburban
housing estates emaciated by years of underinvestment to
enjoy the same quality of local environment, facilities and
services as families with equivalent real incomes and status in
China, Malaysia (where this briefing paper was written) and
many other places less wedded to the twentieth-century
municipal governance model, there needs to be urban land
reform. Something equivalent to school opt-out is needed,
where neighbourhoods, variously defined and constituted can
take control of their local spaces, with various rights
transferred from the local state to a legally constituted
residents’ association, mutual association, trust or share-
holding company. There would need to be a menu of legal
vehicles to transfer property rights to suit particular local
circumstances. The right of the state would be a residual one: it
would retain control over (a) those functions and responsi-
bilities that residents do not want and (b) trunk infrastructure
necessary for the functioning of the city as a whole. Rights and
responsibilities would be realigned contractually in a way that
maximises the value of the neighbourhood to principal
stakeholders (Webster, 2003).
In a recent study of Seoul, Korea, conducted with co-author
Yoonseuk Woo, it was found that a mature private
neighbourhood market will efficiently price local public goods
if allowed to grow without undue regulatory hindrance (Woo
and Webster, 2011). In fact, the regulation has the opposite
affect in South Korea, as in many other countries: it is
designed to encourage more not less privately supplied
neighbourhood facilities. Seoul’s high rise gated apartment
complexes are required by law to deliver a certain quantity of
public goods such as (depending on their size) kindergartens,
primary schools, parks, parking and security; and to create
sufficient sink funds to be able to maintain and reinvest in
these club facilities. This is evidence that private and public
urban governance institutions will co-evolve where they are
allowed to; in this case, public laws being used to structure the
private neighbourhood market to secure the interests of
residents.
A particularly large private suburb in the city of Wuhan in
central China that the author came across during a UN
assignment has been built, governed and managed by a profit
company (chaired by an entrepreneur named Mao). It provides
private social security to its residents, free annual medical
check-ups for the over sixties and children and scholarships for
its young people going to university – all subsidised from the
company’s operating profits. Its landscaped gardens, sports
facilities and courteous private security force of 60 officers are
all immaculate. In the private town hall, pictures of happy
residents waving ribbons in synchronised outdoor dance
formation are reminiscent of Mao’s propaganda posters of a
bygone age; and when the author asked about the obviously
high level of community spirit flowing through the veins of the
private city, he learned that Entrepreneur Mao saw his creation
as a modern means of achieving communist ideals: a
contractual community themed on a romantic memory of
communism circa 1950. It demonstrably worked very much
better than the original dream.
Prime Minister Cameron’s Big Society quietly slipped off the
agenda because no one could really understand what it meant
or could imagine how to achieve it. Liberating urban land from
state control and turning the property market into a
neighbourhood market might be the big idea waiting to
happen in Britain’s dysfunctional cities.
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WHAT DO YOU THINK?
To discuss this briefing, please email up to 500 words to
the editor at journals@ice.org.uk. Your contribution will
be forwarded to the author(s) for a reply and, if
considered appropriate by the editorial panel, will be
published as discussion in a future issue of the journal.
Proceedings journals rely entirely on contributions sent in
by civil engineering professionals, academics and stu-
dents. Papers should be 2000–5000 words long (briefing
papers should be 1000–2000 words long), with adequate
illustrations and references. You can submit your paper
online via www.icevirtuallibrary.com/content/journals,
where you will also find detailed author guidelines.
Urban Design and Planning
Volume 165 Issue DP1
Briefing: Cities of clubs
Webster
6
